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The consequences of global warming are now well defined and particularly alarming. In view of the stupendous
economic advances of the larger NICs, with China in the first rank, no “business as usual” scenario in the matter of
GHG emissions can be acceptable. The aim of this article is to expose the challenges posed to the Chinese economy in
adapting to the disciplines of sustainability.
JEAN-FRANÇOIS  HUCHET  AND JEAN-PAUL  MARÉCHAL
Ethics and 
Development Model 
China ’s  Economic  Growth  Cha l l enge s  the  Future  o f  Wor ld  C l imate
« Cela n’est pas volontaire, vous êtes embarqué. »
Blaise Pascal, Pensées
A lthough we have still a long way to go in the fieldof modelling the earth’s climate, the conse-quences of global warming are now pretty well
understood. Such doubts as still persist do not indeed jus-
tify any illusions about what humanity may expect if, facing
this ever more precise threat, we indulge in time-wasting.
The consequences would of course vary according to how
high temperatures might rise, but in any case they would af-
fect food supplies (lower agricultural output), supplies of
drinking water (the melting of glaciers), salt water (rises in
sea level leading to salinisation in river deltas and the flood-
ing of some cities, such as New York and Hong Kong),
ecosystems (coral reefs) and the frequency and intensity of
extreme meteorological phenomena (hurricanes and forest
fires). Moreover, rising temperatures and humidity levels
would threaten us mortals and our livestock with the prolif-
eration of numerous pathogenic agents. Lastly, the disap-
pearance of the polar ice-cap and the disruption of ocean
currents might very well lead to rapid and generalised dis-
turbances of the climate. In fact, according to the over-
whelming majority of scientists, many of these phenomena
are already with us. If we do not take swift and far-reaching
measures, Nicholas Stern((1) explains in a report published
last autumn, climatic change will cost the world economy
the astronomic sum of 5,500 billion euros over the next half
century and create more than 200 million migrants. Assum-
ing an average increase of between 5°C and 6°C in global
temperatures (a perfectly reasonable expectation), the
writer estimates that global GDP would fall by between 5%
and 10%.
Reading this data forces us to a conclusion: all of us, human
beings and nations, have a collective interest in arresting the
present course of climate change. But there is another argu-
ment just as blindingly obvious and no less persuasive: all of
us have just as great an interest, with a view to maximising our
short-term benefits, in keeping up our voracious consumption
of fossil fuels. Thus, each of us—states and individual citizens,
rich and poor alike—ends up, with the fine reasoning of homo
economicus, by being unreasonable . . . at the deepest level
of reason. Economists call that “the prisoner’s dilemma.”
Furthermore, as if that were not enough, this dilemma has
been sharpened by the staggering economic advances made
by some Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs). In their
first rank is China which, this very year, is expected to over-
take the United States in emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs). Despite the undeniable historical responsibility of
developed countries for anthropogenic global warming, re-
cent forecasts by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in-
dicate that the increase in China’s emissions of CO2 be-
tween now and 2030—four additional gigatons (Gt)—would
by itself constitute 40% of all additional emissions by all the
world’s countries and nearly double those of the industri-
alised countries((2). China’s right to development and that of
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2. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2006, Paris, 2006, p. 188.
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other big NICs such as India and Brazil is entirely legiti-
mate, but it does raise a very particular ethical problem in
the context of future climate change: how can the legitimate
economic development of these great nations be assured
without nullifying international efforts to limit GHG emis-
sions? What is more, the effects caused by the size and pop-
ulation of these countries make it impossible for us to argue
solely in relative terms. The fact that each American emits
(expressed as a yearly average) three times more CO2 than
a Chinese person cannot in any way lead us to conclude
that, in the interests of “justice,” no measures for controlling
Chinese emissions should be taken so long as Chinese indi-
vidual emissions lag behind American ones. Indeed, if indi-
vidual emissions in China did reach levels comparable to
those in America, one can easily imagine the state that the
world climate would be in.
International negotiations on climate control are thus held up
pending the outcome of a sort of team poker game. Facing
each other over the cards are not, as people too casually as-
sert, the North and the South; the teams are, on one side,
the developed countries and, on the other, the NICs—and
China in particular((3). The interaction between the Ameri-
can and Chinese positions throws light on the internal logic
of this kind of rivalry, the immensity of the problem that hu-
mankind absolutely must solve over the next decade. At the
risk of over-simplifying, one might say that, so far at least
(even though at the level of a few big American cities and
one state, California, things seem to be developing
favourably)((4), Washington is tied up in knots seeking to de-
fend its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol while Beijing refuses
any coercive measure that might limit China’s emissions of
GHGs. Admittedly, each government has excellent argu-
ments to deploy. The United States asserts that any unilat-
eral reduction of its CO2 emissions would not only be likely
to harm its overall economic performance but also—and this
is true enough—would have no really positive effect on the
world’s climate unless the developing countries (China in
particular) followed suit. In answer, the Chinese authorities
counter—not unreasonably—that they have no historical re-
sponsibility for global warming and that it is outrageous to
suggest curtailing their right to economic growth and, there-
fore, to the benefits of the consumer society. It would be
hard to imagine a more intractable deadlock—or a more trou-
bling one, in that the resulting clash of state urgently threat-
ens a “global public good”: climatic stability.
The “business as usual” scenario is not an option if we want
to avoid in the medium term throwing the earth’s climate out
of balance. Thus, we must find a way out of the logical, eth-
ical and practical trap that we are in, by devising a solution
acceptable to all. Adopting a more sustainable form of
growth on a global scale seems to be the only answer to the
dilemma posed by the big NICs. As we shall show in the
first part of this article, in terms of GHG emissions, China
is the prisoner of its own growth model. Since the Chinese
government wishes, quite legitimately, to continue improving
its people’s living standards over the decades ahead, the only
possible way of solving the equation lies in the rapid emer-
gence of a more sustainable form of growth. This develop-
ment would, in addition, allow China to take a more active
stance in international climate negotiations: it might even
break the stalemate with the United States which, deprived
of any realistic arguments against, ought to play a full part in
the “post-Kyoto” processes. Nevertheless, as we shall am-
plify in the second part, despite a new awareness on the part
of the Chinese government and the launching of multiple po-
litical initiatives designed to control emissions, there still re-
main numerous setbacks on the technological and economic
fronts, as well as problems with political incentives for indus-
trial managers to change their behaviour.A non sustainable form ofgrowth
In 1950, China emitted 79 million tons of CO2, which was
1.13% of the total for world emissions at that time((5). In
2004, it emitted 6.1 Gt of GHGs((6), an amount equal to
15% of world emissions and all experts now agree that
China is about to overtake the United States and to become
the world’s biggest emitter of GHGs. The rapid expansion
of these emissions in China, averaging a yearly increase of
nearly 4% between 1994 and 2004((7), is obviously linked to
the acceleration in the rate of economic growth since the
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3. Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol, which came into force on 16 February 2005, was on that
date ratified by 156 countries (22 developed countries, 13 newly industrialised countries
and 121 developing countries); six countries signed without ratifying (among them the
United States and Australia who declared they had no intention of so doing); lastly, 30
countries neither signed nor ratified the Protocol. The signatories are divided into two
groups. The smaller group, the developed countries, have signed Annex I, committing
themselves to reduce their emissions of GHGs. The “non Annex I” countries include the
developing countries and the NICs (including China): none of them are yet committed to
reducing emissions. And after the failure of the Hague Conference of 2001, the coun-
tries of the European Union decided to adhere to the Kyoto Protocol at a time when it
was not legally binding.
4. See for example Philippe Grangereau, “La Californie prend l’auto par les cornes,”
Libération, 22 September 2006 and Guillaume Serina, “Climat. La révolte des maires
américains,” Le Monde, 12 October 2006.
5. People’s Republic of China National Climate Change Programme, 4 June 2007, 56 pp.
6. Or 6.1 Gt of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e), ibid., p. 4.
7. Ibid .p. 5.
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launch of the reforms in 1978. But beyond that observation,
it is important to identify some basic factors in China’s eco-
nomic development that have caused such a phenomenon.
This analysis will help us, secondly, to identify the chal-
lenges facing the Chinese government as it attempts to pro-
mote a more sustainable form of development.
The increase in China’s population is most certainly the
most fundamental indirect factor in explaining the huge
growth in emissions of GHGs and, more generally, the rapid
pollution of the environment that we have been witnessing
over the past half-century in China. The campaign to raise
the birth rate that Mao launched at the end of the 1950s led
to an exponential increase in the population. Today there
are estimated to be 750 million more people in China than
were registered in the first census in 1953. Although each
individual Chinese person emits three times less CO2 than
do individuals in the OECD countries, the demographic
weight of China is such that it is impossible to calculate only
in relative terms when assessing the impact of China’s GHG
emissions on world climate((8). The economic takeoff of so
populous a country leads inevitably to an explosion in the
demand for energy. Last year alone, five new 300 megawatt
power stations came into production each week in China,
raising its energy output in just one year by the equivalent of
the total output of France((9). Between 1990 and 2004,
China’s additional production of electrical energy has
caused emissions of 2.5 Gt of CO2((10), this sector being prin-
cipally responsible for the country’s emissions of GHGs.
Furthermore, as is shown in the article by Jean-Marie Mar-
tin Amouroux published in this dossier, 83% of China’s elec-
tricity is generated by conventional coal-burning power
plants. It so happens that coal, compared with the other
forms of fossil fuel traditionally used in power plants, namely
gas and oil, releases into the atmosphere twice as much
CO2. That explains the rapidly growing contribution made
by power stations to China’s total GHG emissions: it has
risen from 14% to 43% between 1980 and 2000((11). In
Guangdong province, China’s biggest industrial and export-
ing region, electricity production has doubled between 1998
and 2004 and, by themselves, the conventional coal-burning
power plants supplied nearly two-thirds of overall production
as against the 20% supplied by oil-fired power stations((12).
For so populous a country, achieving such record rates of eco-
nomic growth, China’s dependence on coal for its enormous
electricity requirements is an additional exacerbating factor in
its unfavourable performance in atmospheric pollution.
The importance of industry in China’s economic growth has
also played a crucial role in the rapid increases in GHG
emissions. The country’s socialist heritage strongly influ-
enced the choice of investments in favour of heavy industry,
which is highly energy-intensive. Despite the emergence of
market mechanisms within the Chinese economy, industry
(and, even more so, heavy industry) remains the sector in
which investment rates and production growth rates are high-
est. Economic development normally tends to promote a
lessening of energy intensity((13) (and, in consequence, lower
levels of gas emission in relation to GDP) due to faster
growth in the services sector than in industry. Even so, de-
spite better accounting methods in the informal services sec-
tor (leading in December 2005 to an official revaluation of
Chinese GDP by nearly US$300 billion), the services sec-
tor has levelled off at around 40% while industry has seen
its share going up ever since the start of the 2000s. Yet, be-
tween 1980 and 2000, energy intensity did fall steadily at an
average 20% every five years. In other words, whereas 100
energy units were used in 1980 to produce 100 GDP units,
Chinese producers were using only 40 energy units by 2000
to produce the same quantity of GDP((14). That amounts to
a remarkable performance for an emerging country. How-
ever, since 2002, energy intensity has started going up again,
which may portend serious difficulties for the government in
its attempts to limit GHG emissions. The high growth of in-
vestment observed in heavy industry since the start of the
2000s is directly connected to that development. Within in-
dustry, it is precisely the steel, chemicals and cement sec-
tors—very high consumers of electricity—that have recorded
the highest growth. The fact that industrial sectors consum-
ing most energy have grown more quickly than industrial sec-
tors using less energy creates a paradoxical effect: energy in-
tensity has certainly continued to fall in all industrial sectors
but, because the production growth in sectors using more en-
ergy was more rapid, energy intensity measured across the
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8. The value of international comparisons based only on per capita emissions is further
weakened to the extent that, in a country like China, calculations include a significant
part of the rural population that plays no part, other than marginally, in the modern econ-
omy centred upon the cities and on mass consumption. China’s GHG emissions are prin-
cipally the product of a modern market economy in which at best only 400-500 million
people are taking any part.
9. Reuters, 23 March 2007.
10. World Energy Outlook 2006, op. cit., p. 80.
11. Ibid.
12. Bill Barron et al., “Owning up to Responsibility for Manufacturing Contributions to the
Pearl River Delta’s Poor Air Quality,” Institute for the Environment, The Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology and Civic Exchange, Hong Kong, 2006, 37 pp.
13. As measured according to the following formula: quantity of energy consumed divided
by GDP.
14. Jiang Lin, “Managing Energy Demand: the Bridge to Sustainability”, China Economic
Quarterly, 4th quarter, 2006, p. 30
whole of industry has increased((15). Of course, this develop-
ment has an undesirable impact on GHG emissions. Two
adjustments would be necessary to limit their growth. Firstly,
a production slowdown in those industrial sectors where en-
ergy consumption was strongest and, secondly, fast growth in
services than in industry. Sadly, nothing suggests that, for
the present, the Chinese economy is moving in that direc-
tion.
Lastly, we should take a detour by way of the political eco-
nomics of the Chinese reforms, to understand the last fun-
damental factor explaining the rapid upward trend of GHG
emissions. Political, fiscal and financial incentives offered to
state officials at the local level led to over-investment and to
fragmentation of the industrial structure. Decollectivisation
of the countryside in 1978 opened the way to the creation
of a multitude of small enterprises in rural areas, known as
Township and Village Enterprises. At first they sprang up
from the repair workshops of the people’s communes but
later on they widened their fields of activity into all indus-
trial sectors. The development strategy of the Maoist pe-
riod—“counting on one’s own strengths”—applied also to
rural areas which, in the context of the people’s communes,
were required to be largely autonomous when it came to pro-
ducing and repairing agricultural equipment. In these cir-
cumstances, starting from the late 1960s and continuing
through the 1970s, there was an explosion of small produc-
tion units for cement, fertiliser, steel((16) and even electricity.
The 1978 reforms allowed these production workshops to
expand into enterprises and to extend their scope of activity.
From 1978 onwards, provincial and local leaders were
judged not only on their political loyalty but also on their ca-
pacity to develop local industry. Their control over local fi-
nancial dealings (and particularly over provincial branches of
the big state banks) enabled them to pursue all-out industri-
alisation without worrying about any national effects arising
out of the duplication of investments. China holds some un-
fortunate world records for the fragmentation of its industrial
fabric. Thousands of small, indeed undersized, producers
making the same products are scattered the length and
breadth of the country. By the end of the 1990s, 8,000 in-
dependent cement producers were operating on Chinese soil,
whereas in the rest of the world the number is put at no more
9N o  2 0 0 7 / 1
15. See the studies done by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
16. The census records nearly 500 enterprises making steel at the end of the 1970s. See
D. Perkins, “China’s Economic Policy and Performances,” in D. Twitchett and J. K.
Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, vol. 15, The People’s Republic, Part 2,
Cambridge Mass., Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 475-539.
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than 1,500((17). The same situation could be observed in
practically all sectors of industry: 123 car producers, 1,500
steel plants, 2,900 glass producers((18). Since the mid
1990s, the authorities have tried—with results varying ac-
cording to sector—to rationalise industrial structures by
closing and merging a large number of state and collective
enterprises((19). Fragmentation of the industrial fabric to this
extent has had direct consequences for GHG emissions in
that it has prevented quite a number of producers from
reaching the critical mass allowing rationalisation of the
means of production or the replacement of old, energy-in-
tensive technologies. Moreover, this fragmentation has also
affected the electricity production sector. The proliferation
of conventional coal-burning power stations has impeded
concentration of production, which would have allowed en-
ergy economies and, in particular, the introduction of new,
less polluting technology. A study recently carried out in
Guangdong((20) reveals that many factories operating in the
textile, paper and agro-alimentary sectors have elected to
produce electricity themselves, building small coal-fired
power plants on their own sites. Obviously, such decisions
slow down the provincial government’s efforts to control
SO2 and CO2 emissions. More generally, the government’s
repeated attempts to rationalise industrial structures have
been blocked by the strong political (and monetary) incen-
tives for local officials to favour quantitative growth; this in
turn is dictated by the concern, at all state levels, to avoid
uncontrolled growth in unemployment, so as to maintain
social stability and, in the last resort, the legitimacy of the
Communist Party.
All these factors—rapid increases in population, depend-
ence on “conventional coal burning” for the generation of
electricity, the high proportion of heavy industry in the
economy and the fragmentation of industry—have com-
bined, ever since the end of the 1970s, to create eco-
nomic growth characterised by heavy GHGs. So when
we consider the present rate of global warming, China
appears in some ways the prisoner of its own non-sustain-
able form of growth. Its diplomatic status in international
climate negotiations is thus weakened: being anxious not
to endanger its own economic development or the stabil-
ity of the present political system, Beijing has very tight
margins for manoeuvre when asked to accept concessions
on limiting GHG emissions. The only possible way for-
ward for China, and likewise for the future of interna-
tional climate control, would be a progressive transition to
a more sustainable and more energy-saving form of devel-
opment.
Towards sustainable deve lop-ment in  China:  the  narrowpath towards a  domestic  anddiplomatic  so lution
The requi rement for  sustainabledevelopment  on  the  international  sca le
In economics, as in other fields of knowledge, progress has
always arisen from two phenomena (simultaneous or inde-
pendent): taking account of a new reality and/or conceiving
of a new perspective. When states are confronted by climate
change, just as the “business as usual” approach is ineffec-
tive, the same applies to the neo-liberal economic approach,
which sees in laissez-faire the remedy for all evils affecting
both the social sphere and the biosphere. What is needed is
a change of viewpoint, supplied in present circumstances by
this notion, both new (it was formulated just about twenty
years ago((21)) and also, in a certain sense, very old (one can
trace its beginnings back to the Old Testament((22)) but at
any rate wholly at odds with the market forces ideology: sus-
tainable development. 
A development process is known as “sustainable” when it
can “satisfy the needs of the present without compromising
the chance for future generations to satisfy theirs.” This is a
programmatic concept that calls for the creation of a double
form of solidarity: sustainable development is “horizontal” as
regards the most impoverished people of today and “verti-
cal” between the generations; it invites us to think of eco-
nomic activity in a global sense both in space (all the real
economies are involved) and in time (the fate of generations
to come must be taken into account). The influence of this
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
17. China Research Team, “China: Price War and Price Control,” in Warburg Dillon Read,
December 1998, p. 14.
18. Zhongguo shehuikexueyuan gongye jingji yanjiusuo, Zhongguo gongye fazhan baogao
1997 (Report on industrial development in China 1997), Beijing, Jingji guanli chubanshi,
1997.
19. Jean-François Huchet, “Privatisation et restructuration des PME d’État en Chine,”
Critique internationale, n° 32, July 2006, p. 173-197 and “Industry Reorganisation and
Restructuring: Prospects, Problems and Policy Priorities,” in OECD (ed), China in the
World Economy. The Domestic Policy Challenges, Paris, OECD, 2002, pp. 161-192.
20. Bill Barron et al., “Owning up to Responsibility for Manufacturing Contributions to the
Pearl River Delta’s Poor Air Quality,” op. cit..
21. The notion of sustainable development was defined for the first time in WCED (World
Commission on Environment and Development), Our Common Future, Montreal, Les Édi-
tions du Fleuve, 1988 (1st English edition 1987). For a brief history of the idea, see Jean-
Paul Maréchal, “Développement durable,” in Jean-Louis Laville and Antonio David
Cattani (dir.), Dictionnaire de l’autre économie, Paris, Gallimard, col. “Folio”, 2006, pp.
153-163.
22. See Jean-Paul Maréchal, “L’éthique écologique de la Bible,” Écologie et politique, n° 33,
2006, pp. 187-200.
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expression has been such that the very meaning of the term
“development” has been affected by it. It does not hark back
to what French people remember as the “Glorious Thirty”—
the three decades following the Second World War, when
the so-called “economics of development” consisted of a col-
lection of analyses and proposals aimed at helping the third
world to catch up with the industrialised countries; rather, it
derives from an all-embracing reflection, taking in all coun-
tries, on the ultimate ends of economic life and thought, and
from the requirement to look afresh at the relationships be-
tween economics, society and the biosphere.
Sustainable development is a normative concept opposed to
any sacrificial approach by economic life: it demands that, in
all circumstances, only equitable solutions should be con-
ceived and put into effect, this being an essential condition
of their being accepted. From Emmanuel Kant to John
Rawls by way of Michael Walzer, Charles Kindleberger or
Jürgen Habermas, there is no shortage of ideas from around
the world offering peace between nations and co-operation
to assure wellbeing for all((23). Yet, whatever may be the the-
ory advanced, the institutional arrangements imagined, the
mechanisms devised, yearly emissions of GHGs must not
exceed 5 Gt of CO2 equivalent (that figure representing
only 12% of the present rate of emissions, now estimated at
42 GTCO2e)((24). This limit for the planet must be applied as
a constraint over and above all political and economic calcu-
lations.
A feasible mechanism, one that is fundamental to the Kyoto
Protocol and also to the European Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS), which took effect on 1 January 2005, is
that known as “cap and trade.” By this expression is meant
an approach whereby a maximum limit is set upon the over-
all amount of a pollutant that can be emitted (the cap) and
a market is created where polluters who emit more GHGs
than their agreed allowances must buy credits from those
who pollute less (the trade).
However, while the cap and trade method does settle the
question of the overall limits to pollution, it does not resolve
that of the initial allocation of emission rights. Possible solu-
tions range between two opposing cases. At one extreme
there is the proposal for “acquired rights” (also known as
“grandfathering”) whereby each polluter, state or company,
is allocated a quantity of polluting rights calculated on two
bases: the overall target for emissions reduction and its own
level of emissions during a trial year. At the other extreme,
there is the proposal for quotas based on a uniform alloca-
tion per inhabitant: the scheme is based upon the notion
that each human being should have the individual and uni-
versal right to emit a certain quantity of GHGs. Between
these extremes, of course, other schemes are proposed. One
idea, for example, is for polluters to start with an initial allo-
cation based on acquired rights, but each would be set the
long-term target of reaching convergence of emission lev-
els((25).
To achieve that demand, despite the obvious need for it, is
no easy thing. In fact, the formulation of a Global Public
Good is complicated by the absence of any transnational au-
thority. Unlike a private good, a public good such as the cli-
mate—and this is also the case with national defence or in-
ternal security—has, according to economic theory, the fol-
lowing two properties: “non-exclusion” and “non-rivalry.”
What is understood by the first is that no economic agent
may be deprived of the benefit of the production of the good
in question; the second is that the consumption of the said
good by one person does not in any way lessen its availabil-
ity for others to consume it. It is this double condition that
makes the market incapable of producing these goods, indis-
pensable though they are to the proper functioning of the
economic sphere((26) itself; and, by that very fact, it makes it
essential for the state to intervene, being the only agent in a
position to finance the production of public benefits out of
taxation. Originally conceived as relating to the national
economy, the notion of public goods has, these past few
years, been extended to the international sphere. Hence the
expressions International Public Good, World Public Good
or Global Public Good and figuring among these goods, of
course, are peace and units of measurement—and also cli-
matic stability.
Added to the failures of the market, however, which justify
state intervention to produce National Public Goods, are the
failures of states themselves in supplying Global Public
Goods; what is true for economic agents in the framework
of the domestic market (namely, opportunistic behaviour) is
also true for states in the relationships they maintain with
each other.
So, one thing is essential: to progress from rivalry to co-op-
eration. For that, game theory teaches us that there is no
Ethics and Development Model
23. See Philip Golub and Jean-Paul Maréchal, “Hyper-puissance américaine et biens publics
globaux,” Géoéconomie, n° 30, summer 2004, pp. 9-40.
24. Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, op. cit..
25. For further details on these measures, see Renaud Crassous and Sandrine Mathy, “Peut-
on étendre le système des quotas échangeables aux PED?,” Problèmes économiques,
n° 2, 904, 19 July 2006, pp. 25-29; Philippe Roos, “Les marchés de droits à polluer”,
Problèmes économiques, n° 2, 904, 19 July 2006, pp. 21-24; Annie Vallée, Économie de
l’environnement, Paris, Seuil, col. “Points”, 2002.
26. Indeed, in such circumstances, no consumer has any interest in paying for something
that is available free; and in consequence no enterprise has any incentive to produce it.
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need for friendship (fortunately: if there were, we should con-
sider moving at once to another habitable planet!), but only
for interactions taking place in time. To put it more precisely,
co-operation may be created out of the sustainability of the
relations between the players, in that the latter may be ready
to meet each other again. Who could deny that negotiations
on climate control are an example of this kind of situation?
But there is still the possibility of tit for tat: one player fail-
ing to attend might push others into retaliating by staying
away themselves. This outcome would, in the case of climate
negotiations, be a recipe for disaster.
Of course, a desirable solution would consist in finding a cen-
tral power capable of enforcing support for a set of stan-
dards((27). Here, there is a French idea that might turn out par-
ticularly apt (targeting specifically the United States and Aus-
tralia)((28). The proposal is for a “carbon tax” on imports of in-
dustrial products coming from countries refusing to commit
themselves post-2012 to some mechanism similar to that
adopted at Kyoto. Such a tax would work well in the Euro-
pean context in the fight against environmental dumping. One
would remind those who assert that such a measure would be
as Peter Mandelson stated “contrary to the spirit of interna-
tional co-operation,” that Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol
of 16 September 1987 (came into force on 1 January 1989)
on substances weakening the ozone layer, obliged all partici-
pating countries to ban, by 1 January 1990 at the latest, any
CFC trade with states which did not sign up to the said Pro-
tocol.
In the absence of any such transnational power, it is for the
present the example set by national policies—adopted uni-
laterally or in concert—that might turn out to be decisive.
Some countries have the courage to take measures harmful
to their own immediate interests, even though, in the long
run, these measures serve the common good (including
their own). In so doing, they are able to make an impact—
at least a partial one—on the way their partners and rivals
prepare themselves to face climate change. Thus, they exert
a persuasive influence, they play a constructive role, they
are (to borrow a phrase from François Perroux) “active
units,” which is to say that they are agents likely to change
the context within which they act. One example was the
perseverance of the European Union after the failure of the
Hague Conference and the US withdrawal from the
process begun in 1997: this made it possible, following
Russian ratification in 2005, for the Kyoto Protocol to
come into force. The emergence of a more sustainable form
of development in a country like China would represent,
clearly, a historical crossroads.
Is  China the  pr isoner of  its  growth model?
China is facing serious damage to its environment. Accord-
ing to the “Environmental Sustainability Index” produced in
2005 by the American universities of Yale and Columbia,
out of 144 countries listed, China lies in 133rd position((29).
All studies are unanimous: Chinese growth must now be re-
shaped into a more sustainable model, if it is not to cause ir-
reversible damage to the environment and a severe threat to
human health((30). The question of GHG emissions is at the
heart of this crisis: policies must be adopted to allow less in-
tensive use of energy and to reduce the pressure on the en-
vironmental resources of the country and the planet. The
sheer extent of the damage so far has shocked China’s lead-
ers and its people. And, ever since the mid 1990s, numer-
ous measures favouring the environment have been intro-
duced. To control GHG emissions, China has in recent
years introduced several energy-saving plans setting ambi-
tious targets for the decades ahead. The Eleventh Plan
(2006-2010) contains an important section on the environ-
ment and on steps towards a more sustainable form of eco-
nomic development. Moreover, the law on renewable forms
of energy came into force on 1 January 2006. The target set
in the Plan is to reduce dependence on coal from the pres-
ent level of 74% to something less than 60%, to restrict
usage of oil because of China’s dependence on foreign sup-
pliers and to exploit renewable sources of energy (including
nuclear and hydroelectric) to the point where they provide
30% of China’s energy needs by 2030. Last June, the Chi-
nese government published a national plan on global warm-
ing((31) partly taking up the measures in the Eleventh Plan
and those in the law on renewable energy sources while pro-
posing a series of institutional innovations and specific meas-
ures on agriculture, industry, services and R&D with the
aim of promoting growth less dependent on GHG emis-
sions. Further, China is an active participant in the Clean
Development Mechanism as provided for under the Kyoto
Protocol. The mechanism is designed to help reduce GHG
emissions in the developing world using technologies funded
by companies in the developed countries (see the interview
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with Philippe Delhaise published in this dossier). And in-
deed, Chinese enterprises are the first, among the develop-
ing countries, to benefit from such financial transfers. A grant
for an exchange of CO2emission rights modelled on the Eu-
ropean experiment is being examined between Guangdong
province and Hong Kong((32). Lastly, among the initiatives
launched in recent years, several pilot trials to cut air pollution
have been carried out in collaboration between environmental
protection agencies of industrialised countries and Chinese
municipalities, notably in the cities of Benxi (in the north-
east) and Taiyuan. Even though these pilots are mainly de-
signed to limit SO2 emissions, they do contribute directly to
reducing CO2 emissions by cutting consumption of coal. Also,
the measures put in place during these experiments could be
used in other Chinese cities((33). In sum, if one takes account
of all these government initiatives, China is certainly, at this
stage of economic development, ahead of other NICs in its ef-
forts to introduce measures to reduce energy consumption.
These projects, including initiatives being taken by private
citizens, are detailed and discussed at length in articles
within this dossier. We seek here merely to assess in a more
general way their chances of success. Indeed, the Chinese
government has commissioned more than one official report
on the environment. This type of document, indicating the
direction of the country’s industrial and technological policy,
is often no more than a declaration of intent, too ambitious
and without any precise operating plans, one that fades on
contact with reality and local clientelism. Pan Yue, Vice
Minister of the State Environmental Protection Administra-
tion (SEPA), declared recently, “China has signed [. . .]
nearly fifty international agreements on respect for the envi-
ronment, and we do very little to honour them. [. . .] Al-
though the new five-year plan sets some good targets, many
provinces have not yet succeeded in respecting the objec-
tives set in the previous five-year plan((34).” Also, before going
back over the uncertainties attending China’s capacity to ad-
vance towards a sustainable form of growth, let us try to es-
timate what might contribute to the success of these policies
or, at the very least, to their being more effective than those
adopted in the past.
The sense of urgency combined with the seriousness of the
damage to the environment and the concomitant threat to
the pursuit of growth might play a positive role. They may
push the central government into maintaining over time its
pressure on local government officials, thus limiting the ef-
fects of local clientelism. Further pressure is also exerted on
different levels of the state via the press and Web discussion
forums, the latter increasingly reflect the growing awareness
in Chinese society of environmental questions((35). When it
comes to financing these policies, the Chinese government
is in a far more favourable situation than it was during the
1990s. Savings rates continue to be among the highest in the
world and government finances are considerably more
healthy thanks to economic growth and the introduction of
far-reaching fiscal reforms in 1994. The Chinese govern-
ment has become far more competent at devising and imple-
menting its industrial and technological strategy than it was
in the 1990s((36). It enjoys the special advantage of being a
late comer in terms of power-generating technology, particu-
larly at a time of strong growth in energy demand. Between
now and 2015, China is planning to build new power sta-
tions whose combined output will equal the total output of
all countries of the European Union((37). The building of
these new plants provides an opportunity for concentrating
production of electricity in large-scale units emitting much
smaller quantities of GHGs, unlike those countries where
growth in energy demand is weak, the stock of existing
power stations can respond to new requirements. Accord-
ingly, China can expect to achieve a significant reduction in
energy intensity by building power stations using new tech-
nology((38). Similarly, the relative price of substitution tech-
nology is likely to drop far more quickly in China in view of
the extent of demand. Between now and 2010, the cost per
kilowatt in US dollars of an IGCC (Integrated Gasification
Combined Cycle) power plant could well be halved, be-
cause of Chinese demand for this type of plant((39). In sum,
these different factors are likely to play a positive role in the
success of government policies designed to limit GHG emis-
sions and to achieve energy savings. They are nevertheless
counterbalanced by the grave uncertainty weighing on
China as to its capacity to break swiftly with the existing
growth model that we have described in the first part, and
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to advance towards a more sustainable method of develop-
ing its economy.
The government’s stated aims are still to maintain growth
fast enough to quadruple China’s GDP by 2020. The fun-
damentals of the Chinese economy (education, infrastruc-
ture, domestic market, exports, budget, foreign debt) are cer-
tainly on course to achieve that rate of growth, even to sur-
pass it. In this context, the demand for energy is likely to
continue to grow at a steady rate. The IEA, in its forecast
up to 2030, considers that China will by itself represent
30% of the world’s extra demand for energy. For its part, the
Chinese government has forecast, consistent with its aim of
quadrupling GDP by 2020, only double the usage of en-
ergy((40), which would imply a significant fall in energy inten-
sity. We noted earlier that China recorded considerable
gains in energy intensity between 1980 and the early 2000s
but that, from 2002 onwards, energy intensity began to in-
crease. In line with those factors associated with the growth
of industry that we have remarked on, several elements sug-
gest that this turnaround could also reflect that the improve-
ments most easily achieved are coming to an end. In fact,
easy progress was recorded by replacing obsolete technology
dating back to Maoist times and to the start of the reforms.
Important sectorial and regional advances were also made
between 1993 and 2002 after the launch of massive restruc-
turing of the state sector. That had led in turn to the closure
or concentration of enterprises set up during the period of
socialist industrialisation, these being inefficient in their con-
sumption of energy((41). Such readily accessible forms of im-
provement are now perhaps in short supply: consequently it
is increasingly difficult to maintain the rate of reduction in
CO2 emissions per unit of GDP, all the more so since strong
growth in industrial sectors will continue((42).
To this difficulty is added another, probably lasting, prob-
lem: strong dependence on conventional coal-burning in the
production of energy and, more particularly, of electricity.
According to the IEA, Chinese demand for electrical power
will continue to swell at a high rate, rising by an estimated
7.6% annually up until 2015 and afterwards by nearly 5%
until 2030. Because of still relatively low coal prices and the
growing external dependence on oil, the IEA estimates that
most of this extra electrical supply will be provided by coal-
burning power stations((43). When we come to the promotion
of renewable energy sources (not including hydroelectric),
even with the best will in the world, their contribution would
rise no higher than 10% by 2030((44). In passing, it is inter-
esting to note that, as a proportion of China’s overall invest-
ment allocated to energy, investment in energy-saving has
fallen considerably over recent years: from 8% in the 1990s
to 4% since the start of the new millennium((45). One of the
most important concerns relating to GHG emissions is
whether China will be able promote widespread use of the
new “clean coal” technology and the CO2 capture process
in coal-fired power plants. We saw a little earlier that, in the
context of strong demand and falling prices for new technol-
ogy, China could mark a technological leap in the new
plants that it plans to build over the next two decades. But
as Jean-Marie Martin Amouroux points out elsewhere in
this dossier, the general application of new technology, such
as the building of IGCC plants, will be possible only in
twenty years’ time. It is also interesting to note that the IEA,
in its energy scenario for 2030, includes none of the tech-
nologies for capture and stocking of CO2 in coal-fired power
plants((46). In 2030—and particularly in Asia where demand
will be strongest—coal would remain the main source of en-
ergy; according to the IEA, China and India would be re-
sponsible for up to 60% of the additional emissions of CO2
from the new coal-fired power stations.
As regards the concentration of the industrial system, includ-
ing the total stock of power plants, despite the progress since
the mid 1990s, one has to observe that China’s industrial
structure will still be widely dispersed, compared with pre-
vailing world trends((47). Studies by the OECD show, more-
over, that concentration indices have varied hardly at all
since 1998((48). Market forces, which traditionally favour con-
centration, operate differently in China: political, fiscal and
monetary incentives induce local government officials to
favour the building of factories in their areas without worry-
ing about the effects of duplication on the national scale.
The decentralisation of the decision-making system as re-
gards investment, launched in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, is at
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the heart of the economic reforms. And Prime Minister
Zhu Rongji’s attempts during the 1990s to recentralise the
system did not fundamentally change it. In a system where
the state continues to account (via its own public enter-
prises) for a little over half of all investment((49) and where
the banking system remains under state control, decentralis-
ing the decisions on investment to the local authorities con-
tinues to cause serious dispersal of investment. The proof is
that, despite constant calls to order by central government
since 2003, and warnings about over-investment and the cre-
ation of bubbles in several industrial sectors, provincial and
local administrations have turned a deaf ear. They have con-
tinued to authorise and to finance the building of factories in
their own areas, in such sectors as steel, car making, con-
struction and chemicals where production capacity was al-
ready excessive. Central government is well aware that de-
centralising decisions about investment to regional and local
administrations is just as much a source of dynamism
(growth rates) as of inefficiencies (in terms of energy and fi-
nancing). Even so, as Susan Shirk demonstrates((50), social
stability is an obsession with the Chinese Communist Party:
and only a high rate of growth can guarantee it. So it is prob-
able that the central authorities are opting to keep this de-
centralised and somewhat anarchic mode of decision-making
on investments, in preference to a more centralised system
that might lead to a concentration of the industrial machine
but would impair the decision-making autonomy of the
provinces and remove the local officials’ incentives.
Population growth is less likely to play an unfavourable role.
The demographic transition has been largely under way ever
since the start of the 1980s. China’s population is expected
to continue increasing at a moderate rate until around 2031,
and thereafter to decline sharply from 2050 onwards. Nev-
ertheless, rapid urbanisation will inevitably have negative ef-
fects on GHG emissions since it is estimated that nearly
400 million people will migrate from the countryside to the
cities over the next thirty years((51). This huge movement of
people is expected to bring about significant growth in the
demand for energy as rural lifestyles change. China’s Acad-
emy of Social Sciences estimated recently that city-dwellers
were consuming 3.5 times more energy than people living in
the countryside((52). The demand for energy generated by the
construction and residential sectors, which already amounts
to 11% of total demand (ranking second after industry), will
therefore grow considerably over the decades ahead. As is
shown in the article by Julien Allaire in this dossier, inas-
much as, once built, cities’ levels of GHG emissions are
more or less fixed, the decisions taken over the coming years
on the building of energy-saving residential apartment blocks
will be crucial, if Chinese cities are to keep GHG emissions
low. Lastly, urbanisation is also likely to contribute in sub-
stantially increasing private car usage. The total number of
cars in the country could thus rise from 25 million vehicles
in 2004 to over 150 million by 2030((53). It goes without say-
ing that, if the Chinese authorities do not resolutely pursue
public transport and strict controls over vehicle pollution, ac-
companied by the promotion of clean alternative fuels, this
exponential increase in the numbers of vehicles on Chinese
roads will lead to big increases in GHG emissions, threaten-
ing to cancel out all the efforts being made in other sectors
of the economy.
So it is still difficult to see whether China will really commit
itself to the path of sustainable development over the com-
ing years. Despite a genuine awareness in government and
society, as reflected in the proliferation of plans to limit
GHG emissions, numerous uncertainties and difficulties re-
main. As we pointed out at the start of this article, inertia
and the pursuit of short-term prosperity are formidable foes
when it comes to tackling environmental problems: they
push individuals and governments into maintaining irrational
options that imperil their long-term survival. In a country like
China, where nearly two-thirds of the population have only
marginal stakes in the market economy, this “prisoner’s
dilemma” is more real than in the developed countries, inas-
much as access to material well-being will remain the first
objective for several hundred million people over the
decades ahead. The Chinese state is modernising rapidly,
but is it truly ready to pursue policies that will have to alter
lastingly and profoundly the behaviour of economic agents,
sometimes risking unpopularity, at a time when many other
states, economically more developed, are meeting many dif-
ficulties along this path? It is legitimate to express doubts, as
we have shown in the second part of this article. It is not sur-
prising that, in its forecast for 2030, the IEA took a prudent,
even pessimistic, line in its predictions for China as regards
GHG emissions: these could amount to 8.8 Gt of CO2 by
2030, which would be 28% of world emissions. They would
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represent half the emissions by NICs; and, between now
and 2030, China’s additional GHG emissions might be
double the combined total emissions of the OECD coun-
tries((54). If this scenario were realised, it would be disastrous
news for the global climate. China’s emissions (together
with India’s) would go a long way towards confirming the
pessimistic forecast in the Stern report. Confronted by these
challenges, one can only hope that the anxieties expressed
in this article turn out to be unfounded, and that the argu-
ments for China being capable of swift development towards
more sustainable economic development will prevail. The
role of the United States in this international and domestic
“poker game” will be decisive. A gesture and a full commit-
ment towards climate control, similar to those made by the
European Union, Japan and Canada, would give extra time
for China (and for India too) to adjust their energy strategy.
Further, it would place China in an increasingly isolated
diplomatic situation in its refusal to accept restrictions on
GHG emissions. The need for China to switch to a more
sustainable form of development would become still more ur-
gent. •
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